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NOTES ON THE CALIFORNIA TORT CLAIMS ACT
THE DISCRETIONARY IMMUNITY DOCTRINE
IN CALIFORNIA
It is a settled rule in California that governmental officials are
not personally liable for harm resulting from "discretionary" acts
within the scope of their authority.' This is the case even if it is
alleged that they acted maliciously.2 On the other hand, courts have
repeatedly held that "ministerial" acts are not within the immunity
rule, and liability will attach to public officers and employees should
harm result from such acts.3 The application of the discretionary
immunity doctrine to the unusual sets of circumstances which find
themselves the subjects of lawsuits has plagued the courts for years.
Currently the doctrine of discretionary immunity is codified in
section 820.2 of the California Government Code:
Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public employee is not
liable for an injury resulting from his act or omission where the act
or omission was the result of the exercise of the discretion vested in
him, whether or not such discretion be abused.
Section 820.2 is part of the Tort Claims Act of 1963, 4 which con-
tains provisions of general application to all activities of public entities
and numerous specific immunities covering areas of governmental
activity which the legislature deemed deserving of explicit coverage. 5
This note will seek to explore the discretionary immunity doctrine
under section 820.2.
Background of Section 820.2
The trend in the United States in recent years has been to depart
from strict adherence to the doctrine of sovereign immunity.6 This
departure has come about by both judicial7 and legislative action.8
1 E.g., Downer v. Lent, 6 Cal. 94, 95 (1856); Martelli v. Pollock, 162 Cal.
App. 2d 655, 658-60, 328 P.2d 795, 797-98 (1958).
2 E.g., White v. Towers, 37 Cal. 2d 727, 730-32, 235 P.2d 209, 211-12
(1951).
3 E.g., Payne v. Baehr, 153 Cal. 441, 444, 95 P. 895, 896 (1908); Mock v.
City of Santa Rosa, 126 Cal. 330, 344, 58 P. 826, 829 (1899).
4 Cal. Stats. 1963, ch. 1681, § 1, at 3266 (CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 810-996).
5 See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 821 (failure to adopt or enforce enact-
ments), § 846 (failure to arrest or to retain in custody), § 850 (failure to pro-
vide fire department), §§ 850.2-.4 (failure to provide adequate fire equipment,
personnel and facilities), § 856.2 (injury caused by escape of mental patient).
6 A good discussion of this trend may be found in Muskopf v. Corning
Hospital Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 213-17, 359 P.2d 457, 458-60, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89,
90-92 (1961).
7 E.g., Colorado Racing Comm'n v. Brush Racing Ass'n, 136 Colo. 279,
316 P.2d 582 (1957); Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist., 18 InI. 2d 11,
163 N.E.2d 89 (1959).
8 E.g., Cal. Stats. 1949, ch. 81, § 1, at 259 (repealed 1963); Cal. Stats.
1959, ch. 2, § 3, at 622 (repealed 1963); Cal. Stats. 1959, ch. 3, § 2, at 1653
(repealed 1963).
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Blanket sovereign immunity came to an end in California when the
California Supreme Court on the same day handed down decisions in
Muskopf v. Corning Hospital District9 and Lipman v. Brisbane Ele-
mentary School District.0 In Muskopf, the plaintiff's broken hip
was further injured when she fell due to the negligence of the hospital
staff. The California Supreme Court had previously held that the
abrogation of the sovereign immunity doctrine was a legislative pre-
rogative.:1 In the Muskopf decision, the court declared that the doc-
trine was a judicial creation, and it discarded the doctrine after find-
ing that blanket immunity for public entities was "mistaken and
unjust.' 12
In the Lipman decision, the doctrine of discretionary immunity of
public employees was reaffirmed. It was ruled that the alleged acts
of the school district's trustees to discredit the superintendent and
to force her from her position were discretionary.13 Although the
court also denied the liability of the school district,14 it was indicated
in dictum that the immunity of a public agency from liability for the
discretionary conduct of its officials was not necessarily as extensive
as the immunity of the officials personally.15 Various factors were
suggested to determine if the particular agency should be immune,
including the "importance to the public of the function involved, the
extent to which governmental liability might impair free exercise of
the function, and the availability to individuals affected of remedies
other than tort suits for damages."' 6
The radical departure of Muskopf from the settled case law of
sovereign immunity apparently caused widespread fear among offi-
cials of state and local agencies that the judicial abrogation of the
doctrine would subject public entities to a liability burden which they
could not bear. The legislature swiftly enacted section 22.3 of the
California Civil Code,17 delaying the effectiveness of the Muskopf
and Lipman decisions until the 91st day after the close of the 1963
legislative session. In the interim provided by the moratorium stat-
ute, the legislature enacted the Tort Claims Act of 1963,18 which
became effective with the expiration of the moratorium statute.
Legislative Intent
According to the legislative committee comment accompanying
section 820.2, the statute purports to reenact the prior case law.,9
9 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961).10 55 Cal. 2d 224, 359 P.2d 465, 11 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1961).
11 E.g., Vater v. County of Glenn, 49 Cal. 2d 815, 820, 323 P.2d 85, 88
(1958).
12 55 Cal. 2d at 213, 218, 359 P.2d at 458, 461, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 90, 93.
13 55 Cal. 2d at 230, 359 P.2d at 467, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 99.
14 Id. at 230, 359 P.2d at 468, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
15 Id. at 229, 230, 359 P.2d at 467, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 99.
16 Id. at 230, 359 P.2d at 467, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 99.
'7 Cal. Stats. 1961, ch. 1404, § 1, at 3209.
18 Note 4 supra.
'9 "This section restates the preexisting California law. [citation omitted]
The discretionary immunity rule is restated here in statutory form to ensure
that, unless otherwise provided by statute, public employees will continue to
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However, apparently because of a certain amount of distrust of future
judicial application to particular sets of circumstances, the legislature
specifically spelled out in the following sections some activities which
were to be deemed "discretionary."20 The Law Revision Commission,
which drafted the Tort Claims Act expressed hope that provisions
of general application supplemented by specific immunities would
"eliminate the need to determine the scope of discretionary immunity
by piecemeal judicial decisions. 2 1  One finds that immunity for any
governmental activity not within the coverage of the specific immun-
ity provisions is dependent upon section 820.2. The codification of the
discretionary immunity doctrine into a provision of general appli-
cation did no more than to ratify a confusing body of case law and
generally offered no new guidelines for distinguishing discretionary
acts from others. Due to the precise language of the specific immun-
ities, those activities which fall within these areas are more clearly
defined as being discretionary. To this extent only has the confusion
of the prior case law been alleviated.
Prior Case Law
Public employees who have been found to be within the discre-
tionary immunity doctrine by the California courts include administra-
tive board members,22 building and loan commissioners,23 building in-
spectors, 24 city councilmen,25 city engineers,26 city managers,27 civil
service administrators,28 county surveyors2 9 court reporters 3 0 game
wardens, 3 ' grand jurors,32 health officers,3 3 judges, legislators, 5
remain immune from liability for their discretionary acts within the scope of
their employment." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 820.2 comment; 1963 JOURNAL oP THE
SENATE 1889.
20 Statutes cited note 6 supra.
21 4 CAL. LAW REVisION CoMm'N, REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS, & STUDIES
812 (1963).
22 E.g., Downer v. Lent, 6 Cal. 94 (1856).
23 E.g., Jones v. Richardson, 9 Cal. App. 2d 657, 50 P.2d 810 (1935).
24 E.g., Dawson v. Rash, 160 Cal. App. 2d 154, 324 P.2d 959 (1958); Daw-
son v. Martin, 150 Cal. App. 2d 379, 309 P.2d 915 (1957); White v. Brinkman,
23 Cal. App. 2d 307, 73 P.2d 254 (1937).
25 E.g., Ellis v. City Council, 222 Cal. App. 2d 490, 35 Cal. Rptr. 317
(1963); Martelli v. Pollock, 162 Cal. App. 2d 655, 328 P.2d 795 (1958).
26 E.g., Miller v. San Francisco, 187 Cal. App. 2d 480, 9 Cal. Rptr. 767
(1960).
27 E.g., Ellis v. City Council, 222 Cal. App. 2d 490, 35 Cal. Rptr. 317
(1963); White v. Brinkman, 23 Cal. App. 2d 307, 73 P.2d 254 (1937).
28 E.g., Hardy v. Vial, 48 Cal. 2d 577, 311 P.2d 494 (1957); Cross v. City
of Tustin, 165 Cal. App. 2d 146, 331 P.2d 785 (1958).
29 E.g., Oppenheimer v. Arnold, 99 Cal. App. 2d 872, 222 P.2d 940 (1950).
30 E.g., Legg v. Ford, 185 Cal. App. 2d 534, 8 Cal. Rptr. 392 (1960).
31 E.g., White v. Towers, 37 Cal. 2d 727, 235 P.2d 209 (1951).
32 E.g., Turpen v. Booth, 56 Cal. 65 (1880); Irwin v. Murphy, 129 Cal.
App. 713, 19 P.2d 292 (1933).
33 E.g., Jones v. Czapkay, 182 Cal. App. 2d 192, 6 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1960).
34 E.g., Haase v. Gibson, 179 Cal. App. 2d 259, 3 Cal. Rptr. 808 (1960)
(chief justice of state supreme court); Reverend Mother Pauline v. Bray, 168
Cal. App. 2d 384, 335 P.2d 1018 (1959) (district court of appeal); Perry v.
Meikle, 102 Cal. App. 2d 602, 228 P.2d 17 (1951) (superior court); Frazier v.
Moffatt, 108 Cal. App. 2d 379, 239 P.2d 123 (1951) (justice of the peace).
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police officers,36 prosecutors,3 7 school trustees,3 8 superintendents of
schools,89 and tax assessors.40
Activities which have been found to be discretionary include
building inspection and regulation,41 issuance of franchises,42 health
protection (including quarantines) ,4 3 law enforcement, 44 legislative
decisions, 45 license issuance and revocation,46 personnel administra-
tion of public employees,47 public works and public improvements
functions,48 and taxation and public finance matters.49
On the other hand, activities which have been classified as
ministerial and outside the discretionary immunity doctrine include
arrest of suspected law violators without warrant or justification,0
35 E.g., Allen v. Superior Court, 171 Cal. App. 2d 444, 340 P.2d 1030
(1959); Hancock v. Burns, 158 Cal. App. 2d 785, 323 P.2d 456 (1958).
36 E.g., Tomlinson v. Pierce, 178 Cal. App. 2d 112, 2 Cal. Rptr. 700 (1960);
Rubinow v. County of San Bernardino, 169 Cal. App. 2d 67, 336 P.2d 968
(1959).
37 E.g., White v. Towers, 37 Cal. 2d 727, 235 P.2d 209 (1951); Prentice v.
Bertken, 50 Cal. App. 2d 344, 123 P.2d 96 (1942); Norton v. Hoffman, 34 Cal.
App. 2d 189, 93 P.2d 250 (1939); Pearson v. Reed, 6 Cal. App. 2d 277, 44 P.2d
592 (1935).
38 E.g., Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary School Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 224, 359
P.2d 465, 11 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1961).
39 E.g., Gridley School Dist. v. Stout, 134 Cal. 592, 66 P. 785 (1901).
40 E.g., Ballerino v. Mason, 83 Cal. 447, 23 P. 530 (1890).
41 E.g., Knapp v. City of Newport Beach, 186 Cal. App. 2d 669, 9 Cal.
Rptr. 90 (1960) (commencement of civil proceedings to abate a public nui-
sance); Dawson v. Rash, 160 Cal. App. 2d 154, 324 P.2d 959 (1958) (prosecu-
tion of criminal enforcement proceedings against alleged violator).
42 E.g., Martelli v. Pollock, 162 Cal. App. 2d 655, 328 P.2d 795 (1958).
43 E.g., Jones v. Czapkay, 182 Cal. App. 2d 192, 6 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1960).
44 E.g., White v. Towers, 37 Cal. 2d 727, 235 P.2d 209 (1951); Tomlinson
v. Pierce, 178 Cal. App. 2d 112, 2 Cal. Rptr. 700 (1960); Rubinow v. County
of San Bernardino, 169 Cal. App. 2d 67, 336 P.2d 968 (1959); Dawson v.
Martin, 150 Cal. App. 2d 379, 309 P.2d 915 (1957).
45 E.g., Allen v. Superior Court, 171 Cal. App. 2d 444, 340 P.2d 1030 (1959)
(questioning a witness at legislative hearing); Hancock v. Burns, 158 Cal.
App. 2d 785, 323 P.2d 456 (1958) (public disclosure of an investigating com-
mittee's findings and recommendations).
46 E.g., Downer v. Lent, 6 Cal. 94 (1856) (termination of an occupational
license).
47 E.g., Ellis v. City Council, 222 Cal. App. 2d 490, 35 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1963)
(officer's decision to compel subordinate to perform his duties); Cross v. City
of Tustin, 165 Cal. App. 2d 146, 331 P.2d 785 (1958) (official investigations on
qualifications and fitness of prospective public employees); Hardy v. Vial, 48
Cal. 2d 577, 311 P.2d 494 (1957) (prosecution of administrative proceedings
to discipline public employees); Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary School Dist.,
55 Cal. 2d 224, 359 P.2d 465, 11 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1961) (official discussions of
the competence and efficient performance of duties by subordinates).
48 E.g., Miller v. San Francisco, 187 Cal. App. 2d 480, 9 Cal. Rptr. 767
(1960) (assurance that specified public improvements would be undertaken
at public expense); Lavine v. Jessup, 161 Cal. App. 2d 59, 326 P.2d 238 (1958)
(decisions on the location of planned public buildings).
49 E.g., Ballerino v. Mason, 83 Cal. 447, 23 P. 530 (1890) (assessments for
tax purposes); Gridley School Dist. v. Stout, 134 Cal. 592, 66 P. 785 (1901)
(wrongful reapportionment of school funds).
50 See Dragna v. White, 45 Cal. 2d 469, 289 P.2d 428 (1955) (arrest of
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assignment of inexperienced youth in juvenile forestry camps to dan-
gerous firefighting duties,51 diagnosis and treatment of diseases by
physicians in public hospitals, 52 disclosure by school officials of con-
fidential information about a pupil when the state statute specifically
prohibits disclosure,53 failure of a superior officer to discharge, sus-
pend or discipline a subordinate known to be incompetent and thus
dangerous to others,54 and refusal to issue a building permit when
all legal requirements have been satisfied. 55
Breadih of Section 820.2
The prefatory language of section 820.2, "except as otherwise
provided by statute,"56 indicates legislative intent that immunity
will attach to all discretionary acts except those specifically set forth
by the legislature.57 A further limitation imposed by the courts on
the scope of the doctrine (apart from finding that the act complained
of was "ministerial") is that the injury-causing act must be "within
the scope of [the employee's] authority."55s "Scope of authority"
has been broadly interpreted to include not only activities established
as primary functions of the office, but also activities which are in-
cidental and collateral to the purposes of the office. 59 The "scope of
authority" requirement has been used by courts to preclude the appli-
cation of discretionary immunity to conduct intentionally exceeding
explicit statutory grants of authority.6 0
The legislature specifically rejected the suggestion made in the
Lipman decision that the immunity of the public entity was not nec-
essarily coextensive with the immunity of the public employee. Sec-
tion 815.2(b) specifies that the liability of the entity is vicarious-
arising from the liability of the employee,61 "except as otherwise pro-
suspected law violator by police officer without warrant or justification);
Coverstone v. Davies, 38 Cal. 2d 315, 239 P.2d 876 (1952) (holding officers
not liable for false arrest on facts).
51 See Collenburg v. County of Los Angeles, 150 Cal. App. 2d 795, 310
P.2d 989 (1957).
52 See Davie v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 66 Cal. App. 689, 227 P. 247
(1924).
53 Elder v. Anderson, 205 Cal. App. 2d 326, 23 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1962).
54 See Fernelius v. Pierce, 22 Cal. 2d 226, 138 P.2d 12 (1943).
55 Ellis v. City Council, 222 Cal. App. 2d 490, 35 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1963).
See Armstrong v. City of Belmont, 158 Cal. App. 2d 641, 322 P.2d 999 (1958).
56 CAL. Gov'T CODE § 820.2 (emphasis added).
57 See note 19 supra.
5s Id.
59 White v. Towers, 37 Cal. 2d 727, 733, 235 P.2d 209, 213 (1951), quoting
with approval from Nesbitt Fruit Prods. v. Wallace, 17 F. Supp. 141 (S.D.
Iowa 1936). See also Frazier v. Moffatt, 108 Cal. App. 2d 379, 239 P.2d 123
(1951); Norton v. Hoffman, 34 Cal. App. 2d 189, 93 P.2d 250 (1939).
60 5 CAL. LAW RLEVISION COmM'N, REPORTS, REcOMMENDATioNs & STUDIES
252 (1963).
61 "Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public entity is not liable
for an injury resulting from an act or omission of an employee of the public
entity where the employee is immune from liability." CAL. GOV'T CODE §
815.2(b). "This section imposes upon public entities vicarious liability for
the tortious acts and omissions of their employees. It makes clear that in the




A statute which has its soul in a single, ambiguous word like
"discretion," can predictably cause problems in judicial application.
Several California courts of appeal which have been called upon to
interpret section 820.2 have indeed had problems. Three different
approaches to the distinction between acts which are "discretionary"
and those which are "ministerial" have been formulated to aid the
courts in applying the discretionary immunity doctrine to specific sets
of facts.
"Dampen the Ardor" Approach
Several California cases have adopted the "dampen the ardor"
approach suggested by Judge Learned Hand in G regoire v. Biddle. 3
Gregoire supplied both a rationale for the doctrine and a test for its
application, reasoning that liability of the public employee and the
entity must be balanced against the effect that the liability would
have upon the governmental function being provided. Judge Hand
expressed fear that the burden of requiring public officials to litigate
claims against themselves, while facing possible personal pecuniary
loss, would "dampen the ardor" of such officials and that it would
"in the end be better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dis-
honest officers than to subject those who try to do their duty to the
constant dread of retaliation."
64
Judge Hand's argument is quoted in the Muskopf 65 opinion and
has been cited in earlier California cases.66 In Lipman the court sub-
stantially paraphrased the "dampen the ardor" approach when it said:
The subjugation of officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the
burden of a trial and to the danger of its outcome would impair their
zeal in the performance of their functions, and it is better to leave
the injury unredressed than to subject honest officials to the constant
dread of retaliation.67
or omission where the employee himself would be immune .... Thus, this.
section nullifies the suggestion appearing in a dictum in Lipman v. Brisbane
Elementary School District [citation omitted] that public entities may be
liable for the acts of their employees even when the employees are immune."
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 815.2(b) comment.
62 Statutes which provide for entity liability even though the employee
is immune include: CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 830-35.4, 840.2 (dangerous condition
on public property); CAL. VEiCLV CODE §§ 17001, 17004 (injuries resulting
from operation of emergency vehicles); CAL. PF. CODE §§ 4900-06 (erroneous
conviction of a felony); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 815.6 (failure to exercise reason-
able diligence to discharge a mandatory duty imposed by enactment).
63 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949).
64 Id. at 581.
65 Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 221, 359 P.2d 457,
462-63, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 94-95 (1961).
66 Hardy v. Vial, 48 Cal. 2d 577, 582-83, 311 P.2d 494, 496-97 (1957);
Elder v. Anderson, 205 Cal. App. 2d 326, 333, 23 Cal. Rptr. 48, 53 (1962);
Legg v. Ford, 185 Cal. App. 2d 534, 543-44, 8 Cal. Rptr. 392, 397 (1960).
67 55 Cal. 2d at 229, 359 P.2d at 467, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 99.
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In Ne Casek v. City of Los Angeles68 the court of appeal for the
second district approved of Hand's reasoning. Ne Casek involved
the negligence of a policeman in failing to use sufficient force to re-
strain an arrestee, who in the course of his flight injured the plain-
tiff. In finding the officer and the city immune under section 820.2,
Justice Kaus expressed fear that to hold subject to judicial scrutiny at
a later date a decision as to the amount of force necessary to make
an arrest would affect the zeal of officers. Such zeal, he thought, is
necessary to accomplish the goals of law enforcement.6 9 Further, if
officers should be liable for decisions to use minimal force to effect
an arrest, the tendency of the officer on the beat would be to use
excessive force. "A rule of law which may encourage police bru-
tality is not desirable. '70
The "dampen the ardor" or "impairment of zeal" approach
to the application of discretionary immunity has been criticized by
Professor Van Alstyne,71 consultant to the Law Revision Commis-
sion, which drafted section 820.2. The rationale behind Judge Hand's
argument is that public employees would be made to fear personal
pecuniary loss, and that officials could be harrassed by groundless
litigation. This rationale, Van Alstyne points out, is negated by the
availability to the official of indemnification by the public entity
for all nonmalicious torts committed within the scope of the officer's
authority. 2 Further, the present system of administration of justice
discourages groundless actions, while it allows those with merit to
proceed to trial.7 3
Professor Van Alstyne further contends that Judge Hand's argu-
ments for immunizing the individual do not justify extending that
immunity to the public entity.7 4 This criticism seems irrelevant, since
the passage of section 815.2 makes the public entity's liability vicari-
ous.
75
To limit the intent behind the "dampen the ardor" approach to
consideration of employees' personal pecuniary loss and harrassment
in the courts deprives the approach of its real meaning. The subjuga-
tion of public officers and agencies to fear of liability cannot help but
impinge upon the freedom of governmental action to some extent.
The chief attribute of the "dampen the ardor" approach is that its ap-
plication requires a balancing of the needs of the public as opposed to
the loss suffered by the injured plaintiff.
The Semantic Approach
The case law prior to the passage of section 820.2 provides numer-
ous examples of activities which have been classified as either "dis-
68 233 Cal. App. 2d 131, 43 Cal. Rptr. 294 (1965).
69 Id. at 135-38, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 299.
70 Id. at 137, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 299.
71 Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A Public Policy Prospec-
tus, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 463, 478-85 (1963).
72 Id. at 478-79.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 484-86.
75 See note 61 supra.
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cretionary" or "ministerial. '7 6 Cases arising under section 820.2 can
draw by analogy from distinctions made in past cases when the facts
are sufficiently similar. The courts have naturally synthesized the
prior holdings into a concise statement of the law, which as an aid
for future interpretation is unfortunately rather useless due to its
generality. For example, the rule formulated in Elder v. Anderson77
was phrased:
[W]here the law prescribes and defines the duties to be performed
with such precision and certainty as to leave nothing to the exercise
of discretion or judgment, the act is ministerial, but where the act to
be done involves the exercise of discretion and judgment it is not
deemed merely ministerial.78
Such a distinction adequately covers the few instances of govern-
mental activity where the activity is either an absolute statutory duty,
or where the discretion of the public officer to act within a certain
sphere is absolute. The twilight zone between "discretionary" and
"ministerial" becomes no clearer by the use of such a semantic yard-
stick. One court has observed that "it would be difficult to conceive
of any official act, no matter how directly ministerial, that did not
admit of some discretion in the manner of its performance, even if it
involved only the driving of a nail."79
Only one California case decided solely on the basis of section
820.2 has resorted to the semantic approach. In Glickman 0. Glasner,s0
the court of appeal for the second district, applied the "rule" offered
by Elder, and concluded that alleged libelous statements by the State
Kosher Food Law representative that certain kosher slaughterers
had been disqualified under law as "schochtim" (slaughterers of poul-
try according to Orthodox Hebrew ritual) were exercises of "dis-
cretion."8' All other cases decided under section 820.2, which have
dealt with the defense of discretionary immunity by the semantic
approach, have done so because section 820.2 was urged collaterally
to a defense under one of the specific immunities within the Tort
Claims Act. 2
The Subsequent Negligence Approach
An act of discretion along with the immunity which it confers
can continue to a point in time. But after this point has been reached,
subsequent harm-producing acts will not be shielded by immunity.
This distinction, which has the effect of severely limiting the doctrine
76 See text accompanying notes 22-55 supra.
77 205 Cal. App. 2d 326, 23 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1962).
78 Id. at 331, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 51 quoting State ex rel. Hammond v. Wim-
berly, 184 Tenn. 132, 134, 196 S.W.2d 561, 563 (1946).
79 Ham v. County of Los Angeles, 46 Cal. App. 148, 162, 189 P. 462, 468
(1920). See also 2 F. HARPFR & F. JAMEs, THE LAW OF TORTS § 29.10, at 1644
(1956).
80 230 Cal. App. 2d 120, 40 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1964).
81 230 Cal. App. 2d at 126, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 723.
82 See, e.g., Goff v. County of Los Angeles, 254 A.C.A. 53, 61 Cal. Rptr.
840 (1967); Miller v. Hoagland, 247 A.C.A. 16, 55 Cal. Rptr. 311 (1966); Burg-
dorff v. Funder, 246 A.C.A. 505, 54 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1966); Fish v. Regents of
Univ. of Cal., 246 A.C.A. 375, 54 Cal. Rptr. 656 (1966).
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of discretionary immunity can be found in Costley v. United States.83
In Costley, with facts almost identical to those in Muskopf,8 4 the fed-
eral government claimed immunity under section 2680 of the Federal
Tort Claims Act,8 5 the wording of which closely parallels the wording
of section 820.2 of the California Government Code. In holding the
government liable for the negligence of the hospital staff, the court
found that after discretion had been exercised by admitting the plain-
tiff into the hospital, immunity would protect neither the government
nor the employees.8 6 The rationale of the Costley rule appears to be
that it is within the sole discretion of the government to extend or
withhold services to its citizens, but once the determination has been
made to provide a specific service, the government will be held to the
same standard of care the law requires of private citizens.
The Costley rule has been expressly adopted in one very recent
California case, Sava v. Fuller.7 The court of appeal for the third
district held that the negligence of a state botanist in analyzing a
plant substance believed ingested by a child was "subsequent" to the
discretionary act of offering plant analysis services to the public;
therefore the immunity under section 820.2 did not apply.88 Judge
Pierce justified the imposition of the subsequent negligence test by a
83 181 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1950).
84 Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 89 (1961).
85 The government is immune from liability arising from "any claims
based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising
due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such
statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance
or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the
part of a federal agency or employee of the Government, whether or not the
discretion involved be abused." 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1964).
80 181 F.2d at 724.
87 249 A.C.A. 313, 57 Cal. Rptr. 312 (1967). There is dictum in the Sava
decision indicating that Ne Casek v. City of Los Angeles, 233 Cal. App. 2d
131, 43 Cal. Rptr. 294 (1965), was decided on the basis of specific immunities.
249 A.C.A. at 319, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 316. A close reading of Ne Casek shows
this is not the case.
Other California decisions contain language which indicates that the sub-
sequent negligence test may have had some bearing on the courts' conclusions.
See, e.g., Collenburg v. County of Los Angeles, 150 Cal. App. 2d 795, 310 P.2d
989 (1957), holding the superintendent of a forestry camp for juveniles per-
sonally liable for negligently ordering inexperienced youth to assist in fight-
ing fire on the "hot line," on the theory that "[i]f discretion is exercised and
a course of conduct begun, a failure to exercise ordinary care will give rise to
liability." Id. at 803, 310 P.2d at 995; see Dillwood v. Riecks, 42 Cal. App. 602,
184 P. 35 (1919). Morgan v. County of Yuba, 230 Cal. App. 2d 938, 41 Cal.
Rptr. 508 (1964), apparently initiated a trend in the court of appeal for the
third district, to adopt the rule of the Costley case (Judge Pierce wrote both
the Morgan and Sava decisions). In Morgan the county sheriff promised to
warn the plaintiffs' decedent prior to releasing a prisoner who had threatened
the decedent's life. No warning was given and the threat was carried out. The
court held the defendant to a standard of ordinary care in carrying out the
promise. 230 Cal. App. 2d at 945, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 513.
Is it more than coincidental that the Sava, Costley and Coflenburg cases
involve children or juveniles in some manner? Are the courts merely say-
ing that the "interests of justice" compel a finding of liability?
8 249 A.C.A. at 322-23, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 317-18.
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close examination of the wording of section 820.2. Emphasis was
placed upon the wording that the act or omission must be "the Tesult of
the exercise of . .. discretion (emphasis added)." The court inter-
preted this language in the familiar terms of tort law, saying "[a] re-
sult is the consequence of a cause and a cause means proximate cause.
It does not include everything that follows later. In short the legisla-
ture has not granted immunity from liability for every act or omission
following after the exercise of discretion."8 9
The court of appeal in Ne Casek apparently considered and re-jected the subsequent negligence test, viewing as too subtle the dis-
tinction between a negligent execution of a course of conduct previ-
ously decided upon, and the primary decision to engage in such con-
duct.9 0 Manifestly, where a substantial lapse of time occurs between
discretion (decision to arrest) and subsequent negligence (allowing
escape), the distinction is easily drawn. But where the discretion
is exercised almost simultaneously with the execution of the act to
implement that discretion (as in Ne Casek), the Costley rule becomes
unworkable. However, if the subsequent negligence approach were
applied to the facts in Ne Casek, there is a high probability that a
court preoccupied with that test would distinguish between the dis-
cretionary decision to make the arrest, and the negligent execution of
the course of conduct decided upon. Once this was accomplished, it
would be a routine matter for the court to find the police officer
liable, despite the suggestion that such liability might encourage use
of excessive force.9 1
The Costley approach to discretionary immunity has been utilized
in California solely in cases alleging negligence of the public em-
ployee. However, where the employee's tort is intentional, the same
limitation on immunity has been achieved by holding that the dis-
cretionary immunity doctrine does not apply when the conduct
was outside the "scope of authority" of the public employee.92
Federal Discreiionary Immunity Rule
A distinction has been urged in federal cases under section 2680
of the Federal Tort Claims Act 93 between those governmental activities
at the "planning level" and those at the "operational level," immun-
ity attaching only to the former. In the leading case, Dalehite v.
United States,94 the plaintiff alleged negligent determination of
safety standards for the handling of ammonium nitrate fertilizer
being shipped overseas as foreign aid. The fertilizer exploded, de-
vastating Texas City, Texas. In finding that the government was
immune under section 2680, the United States Supreme Court held
that the formulation of safety standards had been made at the plan-
ning level on the basis of policy judgment and decision.9 5 Shortly
89 Id. at 316-17, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 314 (emphasis in original).
90 233 Cal. App. 2d at 137-38, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 299.
91 See text accompanying note 70 supra.
92 Authorities cited notes 58-60 supra.
93 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1964).
94 346 U.S. 15 (1953). See also Eastern Air Lines v. Union Trust Co., 221
F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd, 350 U.S. 907 (1955), modified, 350 U.S. 961 (1956).
95 346 U.S. at 35-36.
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after the Dalehite decision, the Supreme Court in Indian Towing Co.
v. United States96 held that negligence at the operational level of
government was not within the immunity rule of section 2680. In
Indian Towing, the plaintiff's tugboat and barge were damaged when
the Coast Guard negligently maintained a navigational aid, and failed
to warn the plaintiff that the aid was not operating. Because there
was no immunity, the plaintiff recovered.9 7
It should be noted that the "planning level/operational level"
distinction stated in Dalehite and Indian Towing has not been cited
as controlling in any post-Muskopf California case. It has been criti-
cized as offering no solution to the dilemma of classifying activities
within the discretionary immunity rule.9 8 It merely substitutes the
equally ambiguous words "planning" and "operational" for "discre-
tionary" and "ministerial."
The subsequent negligence approach of the CostZey decision ap-
pears upon close examination to be an extension of the planning/
operational level distinction. The discretion about which Costley
speaks is the ability of the government to extend or withhold services
to its citizens with total immunity. Such "discretion" corresponds
quite closely with the "planning level" activities which are immune
under the holding of Dalehite.
Appraisals of the Various Approaches
While undoubtedly there are many cases where either judicial prece-
dent or reason compel a holding in particular situations that a duty
is discretionary or ministerial, there are others . .. where precedent
at least is lacking. Thus we must look to the reasons advanced injustification of the discretionary immunity doctrine and determine
whether in the situation before us, they are applicable.99
The very nature of selective sovereign immunity is that it at-
tempts to balance the loss suffered by the plaintiff against the effect
which liability would have on the governmental entity. Such bal-
ancing makes infinitesimally remote the possibility of devising a me-
chanical rule, such as the semantic test discussed above,100 to cover
all diverse fact situations to which discretionary immunity might
apply.
The "dampen the ardor" and "subsequent negligence" approaches
are irreconcilable. Judging by its effect, the subsequent negligence
doctrine appears to have as its foundation the philosophy that gov-
ernmental liability should conform closely to the liability of the pri-
vate person. The subsequent negligence approach could have the
effect of "dampening the ardor" of public officials to the extent that
they will be reluctant to exercise the discretion vested in them. The
imposition of blanket liability upon courses of conduct deliberately
undertaken would tend to foster caution while engaged in that course
96 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
97 Id. at 69.
98 Peck, The Federal Tort Claims Act, A Proposed Construction of the
Discretionary Function Exception, 31 WAsH. L. REv. 207, 219 (1956).
99 Ne Casek v. City of Los Angeles, 233 Cal. App. 2d 131, 136, 43 Cal. Rptr.
294, 298 (1965).
100 See text accompanying notes 77-82 supra,
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of conduct; however, it would discourage embarking upon any course
of conduct.
It is possible that a court applying the "dampen the ardor" ap-
proach to the facts of the Sava case could have found the state botan-
ist immune. Such immunity could be predicated upon a finding that
liability for negligent analysis would tend to discourage the botanist
from agreeing to make an analysis in the future. Yet the subsequent
negligence test compels a holding of liability despite the fact that
such liability may have the effect of denying the public a vital func-
tion of government. It must be conceded that the subsequent neg-
ligence test seems to offer greater predictability in its application due
to its mechanical nature, and if generally recognized by all Cali-
fornia courts, it would have the corollary effect of discouraging
groundless litigation. However, predictability of result is only one
of many factors discussed above which should be considered by the
courts when interpreting section 820.2.
Conclusion
It would be unfortunate if the California Supreme Court rejected
its own recognition of the "dampen the ardor" approach 10 1 in favor
of the subsequent negligence rule proposed by the court of appeal for
the third district.10 2  Sovereign immunity is an area of the law in
which inflexible rules are impractical. The inherent inflexibility of
the subsequent negligence test detracts from any possible benefits
which its adoption might bestow. On the other hand, the "dampen
the ardor" approach requires balancing the merits of the plaintiff's
case against the effect liability would have upon the governmental
function involved. Such balancing seems more in tune with the legis-
lative intent behind the Tort Claims Act of 1963.
Justin A. Roberts*
101 See text accompanying note 67 supra.
102 See text accompanying note 88 supra.
* Member, Second Year Class.
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